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Fleecing the Family Jewels
Christina M. Sautter*
Crown jewel lock-up options, a common deal protection device employed during the
1980s’ mergers and acquisitions boom, are back. During their popularity in the 1980s, these
options took the form of agreements between a target company and a buyer, pursuant to which
the target granted the buyer the right to purchase certain valuable assets, or crown jewels, of the
target corporate family in the event the merger did not close. After both state and federal courts
questioned the validity of these lock-ups in the 1980s, lock-ups lost their luster and dealmakers
stopped using them. But as the saying goes, “everything old becomes new again,” and crown
jewel lock-ups have made a return in recent transactions. This time around, dealmakers have
been quick to distinguish the modernized crown jewel lock-ups from their predecessors.
Although there has been limited case law addressing the validity of these lock-ups, courts
appear more likely to uphold the lock-up if the lock-up can be attributed to a business purpose
other than the merger and if the lock-up could be a stand-alone agreement, separate and apart
from the merger. This Article argues, however, that today’s lock-ups are not significantly
different from their predecessors. Practitioners and courts should not lose sight of the 1980s
jurisprudence that closely scrutinized the sale process preceding a lock-up as well as the
deterrent effects of the lock-up on potential bidders. Failing to consider these factors and not
giving these factors proper weight potentially results in companies and their shareholders being
fleeced of their corporate family jewels and their value. At the same time, however, dealmakers
should not be as quick to shy away from lock-ups as they have been in the past. As the 1980s
jurisprudence made clear, lock-ups can be used to enhance shareholder value. In particular, this
Article argues that dealmakers may use lock-ups after an extensive sale process to incentivize
bidders and extract additional value for shareholders.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, Prince Charles proposed to Lady Diana Spencer with an
oval sapphire and diamond ring.1 The announcement of the royal
engagement made global headlines, and the nontraditional ring choice
1.
Untold Stories Behind Kate’s 18-Carat Sapphire, TODAY, http://www.today.
com/id/40217151/ns/today-today_news/t/untold-stories-behind-kates--carat-sapphire/
(last
updated Nov. 16, 2010, 12:05 PM).
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spawned a vast demand for replicas.2 Demand for replicas of the ring,
however, eventually withered like the royal marriage.3 Almost three
decades later, Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s son, Prince William,
proposed to Kate Middleton with the same sapphire ring.4 As was the
case in 1981, within minutes of the ring’s unveiling, “jewelry stores
around the world started getting calls . . . requesting replicas of the
ring.”5 The now-iconic sapphire ring is not the only crown jewel from
the 1980s that has awoken from its slumber this decade.6 The crown
jewel lock-up, a once-popular 1980s mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
device, has reemerged in recent years and is gaining a modern-day
following.7
A crown jewel lock-up8 is an agreement between a target
company and a buyer that provides the buyer with an option to
purchase certain vital and profitable assets, or “crown jewels,” of the

2.
Id.
3.
See Kate Middleton’s Engagement Ring: ‘Everyone Wants To Copy Her,’
HELLO! (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.hellomagazine.com/brides/2014010916431/katemiddleton-engagement-ring-cost/ (stating that “[w]ith Diana, everyone loved her but there
was always a lot of controversy surrounding her marriage and death” and further describing
how jewelers did not carry replicas of the ring until Kate Middleton started wearing it); Peter
Victor & Colin Brown, Diana Accepts Charles’s Divorce Terms, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 28,
1996), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/diana-accepts-charless-divorce-terms-1321560.
html (detailing Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s divorce).
Untold Stories Behind Kate’s 18-Carat Sapphire, supra note 1.
4.
Id.; see also Lauren Milligan, The Kate Effect, BRITISH VOGUE (July 22, 2011),
5.
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2011/07/22/kate-middleton-fashion-style--shopping-influence
(describing the increase in demand for diamond and sapphire rings following the royal
engagement).
6.
The term “crown jewel” is used broadly here, because the sapphire ring is not
technically a Crown Jewel of the United Kingdom; the Crown Jewels are those “ceremonial
and symbolic objects associated with the coronations of English Kings and Queens.” The
Crown Jewels, OFFICIAL WEBSITE BRITISH MONARCHY, http://www.royal.gov.uk/the%
20royal%20collection%20and%20other%20collections/thecrownjewels/overview.aspx (last
visited Jan. 2, 2016). The Crown Jewels of the United Kingdom are kept at the Tower of
London and “include the crowns of Sovereigns, Consorts and Princes of Wales, both past and
present, scepters, orbs, rings, swords, spurs, bracelets and robes, all of which have a specific
part to play in the ritual of the English coronation service.” Id.
See Daniel E. Wolf, David B. Feirstein & Joshua M. Zachariah, Crown Jewels—
7.
Restoring the Luster to Creative Deal Lock-Ups?, KIRKLAND M&A UPDATE 1 (Feb. 14,
2013), http://www.kirkland.com/Files/MA_Update/021413.pdf; Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik:
Three Trends for 2013 in the Corporate and Deal World, WALL STREET J. DEAL J. (Dec. 27,
2012, 3:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/27/dealpolitik-three-trends-for-2013-inthe-corporate-and-deal-world/.
8.
The term “crown jewel lock-up” will be referred to as a “lock-up option,” a “lockup,” or as an “asset lock-up” throughout this Article. Although the term “lock-up” can be
used in the M&A context to refer to other deal protection devices, the term “lock-up” refers
only to crown jewel lock-ups in this Article.
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target.9 The option to purchase is at a preset price that is generally less
than the assets’ market value.10 Although the target and buyer enter
into the lock-up in anticipation of, or at the same time as, a merger
agreement, the lock-up is typically a separate, stand-alone agreement.11
The option typically becomes exercisable if a third party acquires
the target or if the target otherwise withdraws from the proposed
transaction.12 Accordingly, if the frustrated buyer exercises the option,
the target no longer owns those highly valuable assets, or crown
jewels.13 Thus, a third party may value the target for less, and more
than likely, the target will no longer be a desirable acquisition
opportunity for a third party.14 Consequently, the crown jewel lock-up
acts as a deterrent; it is a deal protection device protecting the
transaction between the target and the buyer.15
Crown jewel lock-ups became popular in the 1980s and were
mainly used as a defensive mechanism in hostile takeovers, as a way of
favoring one bidder over another in those transactions.16 When
9.
Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 n.37 (Del. 1989) (“[Crown jewels] are valuable assets
or lines of business owned by a target company.”).
10. Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty
of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1424 n.349 (1989); see also Macmillan, 559 A.2d at
1286 n.37 (explaining that crown jewels are sold or optioned “at bargain prices”). Although
the option is generally priced at less than market value, the option must be fair to
shareholders. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 278 (2d
Cir. 1986) (explaining that, in reviewing a lock-up challenge, a court does not need to
determine the “‘precise value’ of the optioned assets,” nor must a court determine “whether
the asset option prices represented fair value,” but instead courts will examine the overall
fairness of the option).
11. See Barusch, supra note 7.
12. Palmiter, supra note 10, at 1424 n.349.
13. Id.
14. See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE
L.J. 1739, 1747-48 (1994) (“Because lockups of all types guarantee the recipient bidder some
of the target’s assets if a nonrecipient bidder wins the auction, lockups are thought to lower
the value of the target to nonrecipient bidders, and, thus to give the recipient bidder an
advantage in the auction.”); Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he traditional
crown jewel lock-up can serve as a significant deterrent to competing bidders and, in some
circumstances, a poison pill of sorts.”). Commentators also have stated that lock-ups aid in
protecting an executed transaction because a third party may lower its valuation if that
valuation “was based on a value for the optioned assets that is higher than the exercise price.”
1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04[6] n.102 (2005).
15. Palmiter, supra note 10, at 1424 n.349; see also Sean T. Wheeler, SEC Hot Topics
Institute: Mergers & Acquisitions Update (Sept. 26, 2013) (unpublished presentation) (on
file with author) (describing how a crown jewel lock-up deters third-party bidders).
16. See Barusch, supra note 7 (describing the invention of lock-ups in the 1980s);
James A. Wachta, Note, Down but Not Out—The Lock-Up Option Still Has Legal Punch
When Properly Used, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1986) (stating that target
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challenged, courts across the country responded with skepticism.17
Although the courts stressed that crown jewel lock-ups were not per se
illegal, the courts emphasized that target boards must not use lock-ups
in a manner that hinders stockholder value.18 The courts repeatedly
stated that if target boards used a lock-up to draw bidders into the
bidding process and to maximize value, the courts would likely uphold
the lock-up.19 In most of those cases in the 1980s, however, the courts
determined that the lock-ups at issue were invalid because they had
hindered the bidding processes.20 Because they hindered the bidding
processes, the lock-ups had the effect of leaving money on the table
and thus fleecing the shareholders. Confronted with this negative case
law, practitioners shied away from lock-ups, and, like a passing fad,
lock-ups went out of style.21 But as the saying goes, “everything old
becomes new again,” and just like the royal sapphire and diamond
engagement ring, crown jewel lock-ups have reappeared in recent
years.22
These “modern” crown jewel lock-ups are different, however,
from their 1980s counterparts. First, these modern lock-ups have thus
companies used asset lock-ups as a way of “induc[ing] a friendly suitor or ‘white knight’ to
acquire . . . a principal asset of the target company for the purpose of inhibiting hostile
bidders”).
17. See Barusch, supra note 7 (“[T]he Delaware courts began to look skeptically at
[crown jewel lockups].”); see also infra Part II (providing examples of courts’ reviews of
crown jewel lock-ups).
18. For a detailed description of the courts’ analyses, see infra Part II.A.
19. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d
Cir. 1986) (stating that lock-ups that encourage bidders to compete in the bidding process
may be beneficial); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010,
at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (stating that lock-ups that “encourage a prospective bidder to
submit an offer” may be upheld).
20. See, e.g., Hanson, 781 F.2d at 283 (holding that the lock-up precluded a bidder
from competing with the option holder); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1286 (Del. 1989) (finding that the lock-up hindered the maximization of stockholder
value); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986)
(finding that the lock-up “had a . . . destructive effect on the auction process”); Holly Farms,
1988 WL 143010, at *6 (finding that the lock-up precluded bidding). But see Cottle v. Storer
Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding the lock-up after considering a
five-month-long search process and the board’s decision process).
21. See Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that lock-ups “fell out
of favor” after the Delaware Supreme Court’s rulings in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.); Abigail P. Bomba et al.,
Vintage Deal Tools Reemerge, FRIED FRANK M&A Q. 1 (2012), http://www.friedfrank.com/
siteFiles/Publications/Fried_Frank_M_A_quarterly_October1.pdf (“Asset lock-ups generally
fell out of use after the late 1980s, when Delaware courts expressed disfavor.”).
22. See Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (“[M]odern and modified
versions of the traditional crown jewel lock-up[s] have been finding their way back into the
dealmakers’ toolkit.”).
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far arisen in the context of negotiated, rather than hostile,
transactions.23 Moreover, practitioners have been careful to attribute
the “modern” crown jewel lock-ups to reasons other than a potential
acquisition.24 For example, if the lock-up can stand alone, separate and
independent from the acquisition agreement, or satisfies an
independent business purpose, today’s courts are more likely to uphold
those agreements as not precluding third-party offers.25 Despite these
differences, this Article contends that the fundamental idea of the lockup remains the same. Namely, the acquirer has an option to acquire
some of the most valuable jewels of the target’s corporate family. In
addition, like the lock-ups of the 1980s, the question remains as to
whether the target’s family jewels, or crown jewels, are being fleeced.
Part II briefly summarizes the most significant jurisprudence
from the 1980s on crown jewel lock-ups as well as practitioners’ and
commentators’ responses. This Part also briefly addresses the
standards applicable to a board’s actions in M&A transactions as well
as to deal protection devices. Part III illustrates examples of “modern”
crown jewel lock-ups. This Part also argues that recent Delaware
jurisprudence lays the foundation for the use of crown jewel lock-ups
in transactions involving the purchase of financially distressed
companies. Part IV argues that despite initial appearances and
attempts to differentiate them, today’s crown jewel lock-ups are the
same as their 1980s predecessors. Accordingly, today’s courts, like the
courts in the 1980s, should focus on the sale process preceding the
crown jewel lock-up. When confronted with a challenge to a crown
jewel lock-up, the courts should not be swayed by whether the lock-up
satisfies an independent business purpose or could stand alone as a
separate agreement independent of the merger. By validating lock-ups
for these reasons, courts would allow acquirers to fleece the crown
jewels of targets. At the same time, however, dealmakers should not be
as quick to shy away from lock-ups as they have been in the past. As
the 1980s jurisprudence made clear, lock-ups can be used to enhance
shareholder value. In particular, this Article argues that dealmakers
may use lock-ups after an extensive sale process to incentivize bidders
and extract additional value for shareholders.

23. Compare infra Part III (describing transactions and “modern” crown jewel lockups), with infra Part II.A. (describing cases involving lock-ups in the 1980s).
24. For a description of these reasons, see infra text accompanying notes 136-142.
25. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
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FORCING CROWN JEWELS OUT OF FASHION

A. The “Fashion Police”: The Courts’ Treatment of Crown Jewel
Lock-Ups
During the heyday of crown jewel lock-ups, courts across the
country examined their use. The resulting jurisprudence provided a
framework for the use of lock-ups in future transactions.
1.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.

One of the earliest and best-known cases examining crown jewel
lock-ups was the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.26 In that case,
the court struck down a lock-up option after finding that the option
“had a . . . destructive effect on the auction process” between a white
knight and a hostile bidder.27 The court found that the lock-up and
other deal protection devices had been entered into precisely when the
board’s “role [had] changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.”28 This obligation to maximize stockholder value
has become known as a board’s “Revlon duties.”29
In addressing the lock-up, the court noted that the Revlon board
had not used the lock-up as a way of enhancing the bidding process,
either by incentivizing the existing bidders to bid more or by attracting
new bidders.30 Instead, the board used the lock-up as a way of favoring
one bidder willing to issue new debt to Revlon noteholders “to support
the par value” of the notes, which were trading well below par value.31
This, in turn, protected the Revlon board from personal liability in
noteholder suits against the board.32 Accordingly, the Delaware
Supreme Court found that the Revlon board had breached its fiduciary
duties in agreeing to the lock-up because the lock-up protected the
“noteholders[’ interests] over the shareholders’ interests,” when the
board owed fiduciary duties solely to the shareholders.33 In its opinion,
the court was careful to point out that lock-ups are “permitted under
Delaware law where their adoption is untainted by director interest or
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

Id. at 183.
Id. at 182.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989).

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 184.
Id.
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other breaches of fiduciary duty,” but that the Revlon board had not
satisfied that standard.34 In other words, the court determined that the
lock-up had fleeced Revlon’s shareholders because it shut down an
active bidding process and accordingly left money on the table.
To truly understand the courts’ subsequent application of Revlon
and cases involving crown jewel lock-ups, we must consider the
intersection of Revlon and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in
the landmark case Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,35 which
announced an enhanced standard of review for a target board’s actions
in response to a hostile takeover.36 In Unocal, the court stated that in
the context of hostile takeovers, there is an “omnipresent specter that a
[target] board may be acting primarily in its own interests,” and thus a
board must show it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another
person’s stock ownership.”37 Moreover, any defensive measures
adopted by the board had to be proportional or “reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.”38 In a subsequent case applying Unocal, the
Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the proportionality analysis
required a two-part inquiry: first, the board’s defensive response must
not be “coercive or preclusive”; second, the response must fall within a
“range of reasonableness.”39
As previously noted, Revlon involved a hostile takeover, and the
court was applying the Unocal enhanced scrutiny. Despite this, the
Delaware courts quickly extended Revlon duties to negotiated
transactions involving a change of control, such that a board’s actions
in these transactions are subject to enhanced scrutiny.40 Conversely, if
the transaction does not result in a change of control, the board’s
actions are subject to the business judgment rule.41 Although not free
from controversy, in 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court extended the
Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices in
negotiated, non-change-of-control transactions.42 Accordingly, “a
34. Id. at 176.
35. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
36. See id. at 954-55.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 955.
39. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d
1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)).
40. Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519,
549-50 (2009).
41. Id. at 551.
42. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932-33 (Del. 2003).
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target board’s decision to engage in an M&A transaction with an
unaffiliated third party, the negotiation process, and the board’s actions
during the preclosing period will be reviewed using either the
deferential business judgment rule or the enhanced Revlon standard
depending on the transaction structure.”43 The deal protection devices,
no matter if they appear in a Revlon transaction or a non-Revlon
transaction, are subject to the enhanced scrutiny standard under
Unocal.44 Thus, crown jewel lock-ups should be subject to the
enhanced scrutiny standard, even if they appear in a non-Revlon
transaction.
2.

Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.

The Delaware Supreme Court later reiterated, in Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,45 that lock-ups are not per se illegal
and that there may be instances where lock-ups may be validly used.46
Specifically, if the lock-up attracts bidders to the bidding process, the
lock-up may be upheld.47 Still, the court was careful to point out that
when the lock-up “involves ‘crown jewel’ assets[,] careful board
scrutiny attends the decision.”48 The court will scrutinize the board’s
efforts to “negotiate alternative bids” before granting the lock-up and
will consider “improvement[s] in the final bid.”49 Like in Revlon, the
court in Macmillan held that the lock-up did not help to maximize
stockholder value and, in fact, had a “directly opposite effect.”50

43. Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 55, 71-72 (2010).
44. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932-33 (applying Unocal review to deal protection
devices in non-change-of-control transactions). Deal protection devices in change-of-control
transactions are subject to enhanced scrutiny because they appear in a transaction governed
by enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, but the courts usually apply the Unocal enhanced
scrutiny standard to such deal protection devices. Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M.
Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 702-03 (2013) (stating that in “examining [deal
protection devices in change of control transactions], the Chancery Court has tended to apply,
or at least mention, the preclusion or coercion elements of Unocal review”).
45. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
46. See id. at 1284-86.
47. Id. at 1286.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc.

A little over two months after the Delaware Supreme Court
issued its oral decision in Revlon,51 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit barred the exercise of a lock-up under New York
law in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc.52 The lock-up
had resulted from “an intense struggle for control” of SCM
Corporation (SCM) between Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated (Merrill Lynch) and Hanson Trust PLC (Hanson).53 In an
attempt to prevent Hanson from taking over SCM, SCM’s
management entered into an agreement with Merrill Lynch to engage
in a management-led buyout of SCM.54 Merrill Lynch predicated its
participation on a lock-up option for SCM’s Pigments and Consumer
Foods businesses.55 Under the lock-up, Merrill Lynch “would have the
irrevocable right to purchase SCM’s Pigments business for
$350,000,000, and SCM’s [Consumer Foods business] for
$80,000,000, in the event that a third party acquired more than one
third of SCM’s common stock.”56 After SCM’s independent directors
unanimously approved the lock-up, Hanson made an all-cash tender
offer “for any and all shares of SCM common stock, conditioned on
the withdrawal or judicial invalidation of the lock-up option.”57
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding that the
SCM board’s approval of the lock-up option was protected by the
business judgment rule.58 The Second Circuit first recognized that
“under New York law, the initial burden of proving directors’ breach of
fiduciary duty rests with the plaintiff,” unlike under Delaware law,
where, in a takeover context, the initial burden is on the target board to
show that it had a reasonable ground for believing that the takeover
threat was a danger to corporate policy.59 But, like the Delaware
Supreme Court in Revlon, the Second Circuit noted that lock-ups are
not per se illegal and “that some lock-up options may be beneficial to
the shareholders, such as those that induce a bidder to compete for
51. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its oral decision on November 1, 1985,
while its written decision was issued on March 13, 1986. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1986).
52. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 267.
54. Id. at 268-69.
55. Id. at 270.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 271-72.
58. Id. at 267, 283.
59. Id. at 273.
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control of a corporation.”60 At the same time, the Second Circuit also
noted that some lock-ups “may be harmful, such as those that
effectively preclude bidders from competing with the optionee
bidder.”61 The court found that the lock-up in Hanson was one that
precluded bidders.62
In determining that the lock-up precluded bidders, the Second
Circuit took particular issue with the pricing of the lock-up.63
Specifically, the court criticized the board for failing to question the
valuation methods used to price the optioned businesses.64 Although
the court recognized that the courts need not determine “‘the precise
value’ of the optioned assets” nor “whether the asset option prices
represented fair value,” it stated that SCM had to “justify[] the fairness
of the lock-up.”65 The court found that in agreeing to the lock-up, the
SCM directors “failed to meet their duty of inquiry and had an
inadequate basis for concluding one way or the other that the prices
were ‘within the range of fair value.’”66
In addition to valuation, the Second Circuit considered SCM’s
claim that the objective of the option was maximizing shareholder
value.67 The court found that the option foreclosed, rather than
facilitated, bidding and that “a competing bidder [was] deterred from
making a tender offer, unless conditioned on the withdrawal or
invalidation of the subject lock-up.”68 Moreover, the court found that
the existence of the option forced shareholders into a dilemma.69 If
shareholders did not tender, they would either end up in the 20%
minority who would be forced out in the second step of the merger or,
60. Id. at 274.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 283.
63. See id. at 278-83.
64. See id. at 278-79. In his dissent, Judge Kearse disagreed with the majority’s
holding that the directors failed to ask questions. See id. at 290 (Kearse, J., dissenting)
(listing questions that the directors asked during the September 10th board meeting).
65. Id. at 278 (majority opinion). The court stated that in “engaging in defensive
maneuvers, such as a lock-up option, a director’s primary obligation is to ensure the overall
fairness, including a fair option price, to the shareholders.” Id.
66. Id. at 279. In considering whether the optioned price fell within a range of fair
value, the court considered various financial institutions’ valuations of the Pigments division
alone, including SCM’s own investment bank’s valuation. See id. The lowest valuation of
these indicated “a $70 million undervaluation in the optioned price.” Id. This 20%
differential was greater than the percent differential of the option struck down in Revlon. Id.
at 280 n.10. Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that there was a “very serious question”
as to whether the assets were “significantly undervalued.” Id. at 281.
67. Id. at 281.
68. Id. at 282.
69. Id.
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if the merger was not consummated, the shareholders would be “left
facing the prospect of the transfer of effectively half the company for
inadequate consideration.”70 Thus, like the Delaware Supreme Court in
Revlon and Macmillan, the Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s
enjoinment of the lock-up in Hanson.71
4.

Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took
a slightly different approach to lock-ups than the Delaware Supreme
Court in Revlon and Macmillan and the Second Circuit in Hanson.72
In its 1988 decision, Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc.,73 the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the Delaware Supreme Court’s and
Second Circuit’s treatment of lock-ups, but also noted that “[a]ll
auctions must end sometime, and [the] lock-ups by definition must
discourage other bidders.”74 Hence the Eleventh Circuit stated that the
relevant inquiry was whether the target “conducted a fair auction, and
whether [the party granted the option] made the best offer,” not
whether the lock-up “effectively ended the bidding process.”75
In applying this inquiry to the lock-up in Cottle, the court first
noted that, unlike Revlon and Hanson, Cottle was “not a classic hostile
takeover case.”76
The takeover in Cottle involved Storer
Communications, Incorporated (Storer). In early 1985, an insurgent
shareholder group announced it would solicit proxies for nominees to
the company’s board who would implement a liquidation and
distribution of Storer’s assets.77 The Storer board determined that this
liquidation was not in the best interests of the company’s
shareholders.78 Thus, in March and April 1985, Storer’s financial
advisor “contacted twenty-two potential purchasers” and provided
confidential information to twelve of the twenty-two.79 Two of those
potential white knights were Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See id. at 283.
See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
Cottle, 849 F.2d 570.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 572.
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(KKR) and Comcast Corporation (Comcast), who ultimately ended up
in a bidding war for Storer.80
After receiving several revised bids from both KKR and
Comcast, the board determined that KKR’s bid was superior to
Comcast’s bid.81 KKR’s bid, however, included a lock-up, pursuant to
which KKR would have the option to purchase either Storer’s cable
stations or its television stations.82 A Storer shareholder brought suit
arguing, inter alia, that by granting the lock-up option, the Storer board
“hindered Comcast’s ability to evaluate Storer’s remaining assets, and
thus effectively ended the bidding.”83 The Eleventh Circuit stated that
the issue was not whether the lock-up “effectively ended the bidding
process,” but “whether Storer conducted a fair auction, and whether
KKR made the best offer.”84 Along these lines, the court examined the
lock-up “in the context of the entire negotiated transaction.”85 The
court considered the five-month-long search the board conducted, the
fact that only two bidders—KKR and Comcast—had expressed an
interest in Storer, and the board’s negotiations with both parties.86 The
court distinguished the lock-up from those in both Hanson and Revlon
in that the Storer lock-up resulted in a significant improvement in the
share price.87 Moreover, unlike in Hanson and Revlon, the fairness of
the option price was not at issue in the case.88 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the Storer board had not abused its
discretion in granting the lock-up.89
5.

In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation

A few months after the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in
Cottle, the Delaware Court of Chancery followed up on the Eleventh
Circuit’s idea of a “fair auction” in In re Holly Farms Corp.
Shareholders Litigation.90 The events leading up to the Holly Farms
litigation began in Spring 1988, when the CEO of Holly Farms
Corporation (Holly Farms) met with the CEO of ConAgra,
80. Id.
81. Id. at 573.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 575.
84. Id. at 576.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See id. (“Storer ultimately received a cash price of $91 per share, $16 more per
share than KKR’s previous offer, and $7.50 more per share than Comcast’s.”).
88. See id. at 577.
89. See id.
90. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
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Incorporated (ConAgra), to discuss the advantages of a possible
combination of the two companies.91 At the end of June, however, the
Holly Farms board terminated those discussions after determining that
a combination of the two companies was not in the Holly Farms
shareholders’ best interests.92 A couple of months later, in October
1988, Tyson Foods submitted a cash and stock offer worth
approximately $49 per share.93 Holly Farms rejected the offer, finding
that it was “financially inadequate,” but instructed its financial advisor,
Morgan Stanley, to “actively explore available alternatives to the
offer.”94 As a result, Morgan Stanley entered into negotiations with
ConAgra and contacted other potential buyers.95
On October 21, 1988, Tyson Foods “commenced a cash tender
offer for all of Holly Farms’ outstanding common stock at an improved
$52 per share price.”96 The Holly Farms board rejected the tender offer
as “financially inadequate,” and Morgan Stanley continued its
discussions with ConAgra while also continuing to explore other
alternatives to the Tyson Foods offer.97 On November 11, Holly Farms
sent a letter to Tyson Foods stating that it would be holding a board
meeting on November 16 to consider its alternatives.98 The letter
stated that the board had not yet reached a decision as to whether Holly
Farms was for sale.99 On November 16 and 17, the Holly Farms board
met to discuss its “viable alternatives.”100 The board decided that a sale
of Holly Farms was in the best interests of its shareholders and that the
ConAgra swap proposal was the best financial alternative.101
ConAgra’s proposal included three key deal protection devices: a $15
million termination fee, an expense reimbursement provision, and “a
lock up option on Holly Farms’ prime poultry operations.”102
Tyson Foods brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction of the
deal protection devices, arguing that Holly Farms did not conduct a
91. Id. at *1.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Those alternatives were a leveraged recapitalization valued at $56-57 per
share; Tyson Foods’ cash tender offer, which had been increased to $54 per share; a “ratio
stock swap proposal from ConAgra which had a non-discounted nominal value of $57.75 per
share”; or Holly Farms could do nothing. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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fair auction and that Tyson Foods never had the opportunity to actively
bid for Holly Farms.103 In reviewing the facts, the Court of Chancery
observed that “at some point” during the board meeting on November
16 and 17, the board decided to sell Holly Farms.104 The court noted
that at that point, the board’s Revlon duty to maximize stockholder
value became applicable.105 The court critiqued Holly Farms’ sale
process, finding that no attempt was made to auction the company in a
manner that would satisfy Revlon.106 Instead, Holly Farms “favored
ConAgra as a business partner” and negotiated with ConAgra
throughout November 16 and 17, while it did not negotiate with Tyson
Foods during that same period.107 In fact, the court found that despite
Tyson Food’s “numerous inquiries” regarding the adequacy of its
proposal, Holly Farms did not encourage Tyson Foods to submit a
revised proposal.108
In reviewing the lock-up, the court first noted that lock-ups may
be upheld where the lock-up is being used “to encourage a prospective
bidder to submit an offer,” but the court also recognized that lock-ups
cannot “end an active auction [or] foreclose further bidding.”109 The
court then found that the Holly Farms board did not use the lock-up as
a way of drawing ConAgra into the bidding process or as a way of
otherwise encouraging ConAgra to submit an offer.110 Instead, the
court stated, “the lock up was nothing but a ‘show stopper’ that
effectively precluded the opening act.”111 The court recognized further
that the lock-up precluded Tyson Foods from bidding for Holly
Farms.112 Accordingly, like the courts before it, the Court of Chancery
enjoined the lock-up option in Holly Farms.113

103. Id. at *3.
104. Id. at *4.
105. See id.
106. See id. at *4-5.
107. Id. at *5.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *6 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 183 (Del. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. The court also enjoined the termination fee and the expense
reimbursement provision. See id.
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Dealmakers’ Responses to the Changing Trends

With the overwhelming majority of cases criticizing crown jewel
lock-ups, the M&A bar was left in a conundrum.114 Dealmakers could
continue to use lock-ups in their deals but risked a court’s enjoining a
lock-up for any number of reasons, including that it foreclosed other
bidders, did not reflect the fair value of the assets, abruptly ended the
sale process, did not enhance shareholder value, or coerced the
shareholders into voting for the transaction. With so much uncertainty,
practitioners chose to avoid crown jewel lock-ups altogether.
Professors John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian probably best
summed up practitioners’ response to the negative case law by
observing and opining:
What is noteworthy about practitioner response to these cases, however,
is not the direction but the magnitude. . . . Presumably an asset lockup
combined with otherwise immaculate manager behavior could
withstand scrutiny, particularly if the deal were scrutinized under
Unocal rather than Revlon. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that
practitioners have chosen to avoid these more nuanced readings in favor
115
of a bright-line avoidance of asset lockups.

In addition to the courts’ hostility toward lock-ups, some
commentators have surmised that boards may not want to risk losing a
company’s crown jewels “if the entire company is not being
acquired.”116 Moreover, target boards may not want to “completely
lockup deals for an initial bidder, thereby precluding the possibility of
a higher bidder emerging (particularly, but not only, where there has
been no pre-signing market check).”117 Similarly, target boards may
avoid lock-up options simply due to the “prevailing wisdom” that such
options harm shareholders because “(i) the bid premium is not allowed
to reach its full potential, and (ii) an enhanced ability to hand-select
acquirers insulates managers from the disciplining aspects of the
takeover market.”118 Whether due to the negative jurisprudence or the

114. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Revlon, 506
A.2d 173; Holly Farms, 1988 WL 143010.
115. John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups:
Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 327-28 (2000).
116. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 14, § 4.04[6] n.102.
117. Id.
118. Timothy R. Burch, Locking Out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in
Corporate Mergers, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 105 (2001).
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practical implications of lock-ups, asset lock-ups went out of style by
the mid-to-late 1990s.119
Some commentators and practitioners have even gone so far as to
suggest that crown jewel lock-ups may be invalid altogether. For
example, in determining the validity of deal protection devices in a
Revlon transaction, commentators have stated that a relevant inquiry is
whether the deal involved a crown jewel lock-up.120 Moreover, while
referring to the use of lock-ups in the 1980s, one prominent
practitioner stated, “I just don't think the law now lets you do that.”121
Until recently, practitioners have shied away from crown jewel lockups, and lock-ups have been virtually nonexistent in deals.122
III. BACK IN STYLE: REFURBISHING CROWN JEWEL LOCK-UPS
The once-popular deal protection device has awoken from its
slumber in recent years.123 The resurgence of crown jewel lock-ups
appears to be a direct result of JPMorgan Chase’s (JPMorgan)
acquisition of financially distressed Bear Stearns during the Great
Recession.124 As part of the acquisition, Bear Stearns, which “was on
the verge of filing for bankruptcy,” granted JPMorgan an option to
purchase Bear Stearns’ Madison Avenue, Manhattan headquarters for

119. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 315, 327 (“[A]sset lockups were rare
by the late 1980s and extinct by the late 1990s.”); Wheeler, supra note 15, at 23 (“Fiduciary
risks associated with these lockups caused them to fall out of favor by the 1990s.”); Eleonora
Gerasimchuk, Stretching the Limits of Deal Protection Devices: From Omnicare to
Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 690 (2010) (“Asset options have been
virtually non-existent since Revlon and Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan.”). What is perhaps
even more interesting is that Professors Coates and Subramanian’s research suggested that
practitioners did not use crown jewel lock-ups as much as the literature suggested. See
Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 327 n.51. But see Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah,
supra note 7, at 1 (referring to lock-ups as a “staple of high-stakes dealmaking technology in
the 1980s M&A boom”).
120. See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE
§ 14.05 (6th ed. 2000) (“Are ‘crown jewel’ assets involved so that other bidders would be
dissuaded from continuing the auction if the lockup were granted?”).
121. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 327 n.54 (quoting an interview with
Robert E. Spatt) (internal quotation marks omitted). Professors Coates and Subramanian also
stated that practitioners responded to the negative case law as if the courts had stated that
lock-ups were per se illegal. See id. at 327.
122. See id. at 327-28.
123. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2 (“After a long period of dormancy,
lock-ups—‘crown jewel’ or otherwise—have seen a recent creative rebirth with some
structural twists.”).
124. Reynolds Holding Sticky Fingers, BUS. STANDARD, http://www.businessstandard.com/article/opinion/sticky-fingers-113022300064_1.html (last updated Feb. 22,
2013, 9:21 PM) (“The financial crisis inspired a revival.”).
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$1.1 billion.125 Under the terms of the merger agreement, the option
was only exercisable if the merger agreement was terminated, and prior
to the termination, an alternative acquisition proposal for Bear Stearns
Bear Stearns shareholders challenged the
had been made.126
JPMorgan-Bear Stearns merger, arguing, among other things, that the
lock-up option for the headquarters, combined with the other deal
protection devices, “disenfranchised the shareholders and depressed
the ultimate purchase price” and that the lock-up option was the
equivalent of a 36% termination fee.127
Applying Delaware law at trial, the Supreme Court of New York
held that the board’s decision to merge with JPMorgan should be
governed by the business judgment rule and that the board “acted
expeditiously to consider the company’s limited options” and avoided
bankruptcy.128 Accordingly, the court found that it should not question
the board’s decision.129 The court, however, did not stop there. It stated
that even if an enhanced scrutiny standard were applicable, the court
would not disturb the transaction.130 Notably, the court stated that Bear
Stearns “contacted over a dozen other potential corporate parties
without obtaining a viable alternative bid”131 and observed that the
“board was apparently concerned with preserving Bear Stearns’
existence by ensuring a merger with the only bidder possessing the
credibility and financial strength to help facilitate a governmentassisted rescue.”132 With respect to the deal protection devices, the
court stated that a heightened standard of review was inapplicable and
that the “financial catastrophe confronting Bear Stearns, and the
economy generally, justified the inclusion of the” deal protection
devices.133 Regarding the lock-up option specifically, the court
considered the head of Bear Stearns’ real estate group’s conclusion that
the “$1.1 billion [lock-up value] represented the building’s fair
125. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 2.1, art. 6.11 (Mar.
20, 2008) [hereinafter JPMorgan Chase Current Report]; In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870
N.Y.S.2d 709, 728 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
126. JPMorgan Chase Current Report, supra note 125, § 6.11. Applicable termination
events triggering the option included JPMorgan’s terminating the agreement because the Bear
Stearns board of directors changed its recommendation in favor of the merger or because the
requisite Bear Stearns stockholder approval had not been obtained. See id. §§ 6.10, 8.1(e),
8.1(f).
127. Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 730, 734.
128. Id. at 730-31.
129. See id. at 731.
130. See id. at 732.
131. Id. at 731.
132. Id. at 734.
133. Id. at 735.
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value.”134 Thus, the court dismissed the stockholders’ complaint.135
Some would say that this has paved the way for lock-ups in modern
transactions.

A. Modern Crown Jewel Lock-Ups
Despite the extraordinary circumstances leading up to the
JPMorgan-Bear Stearns merger, the Bear Stearns lock-up has brought
lock-ups back into fashion. Practitioners, however, are conscious of
the lessons learned from the 1980s case law. They note that courts
may view lock-ups “more favorably” if they involve targets, like Bear
Stearns, who are “facing ‘merge-or-die’ financial distress.”136 At the
same time, practitioners are quick to stress that “[w]hat might pass
muster for targets in ‘life-or-death’ situations or in financial distress
may not be advisable forms of deal protection in the ordinary
course.”137 Practitioners point out, however, that if the target board “has
a demonstrable business purpose for, or benefit from,” the lock-up, it
may be easier to defend.138 Also, if the lock-up can “stand[] on its
own,” separate and apart from the business combination, the
arrangement may be more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.139
Likewise, if the parties can articulate a “particular need of the buyer”
that is satisfied by the lock-up, commentators suggest that the courts
may be more likely to uphold the lock-up.140 Possible examples of a
buyer’s need or other justification for demanding a lock-up include
“foregoing another acquisition opportunity or business development
efforts” to pursue an acquisition of the target.141 Practitioners have
incorporated these “lessons” into recent transactions.142 The following
is a detailed description of those recent transactions including
“modern” crown jewel lock-ups.
134. Id. at 734.
135. See id. at 741.
136. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25.
137. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
138. Id.; see also David Benoit, Security Detail Protects NYSE Deal, WALL STREET J.
(Jan. 30, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732392
6104578274112350462452 (summarizing Professor Coates’ opinion that “[c]ourt rulings
generally say an agreement that makes business sense for the seller, and its shareholders, is
allowable”); Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25 (“Seller should have a discernible benefit from
executing an independent agreement other than circumventing fiduciary concerns.”).
139. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2; see also Wheeler, supra note 15,
at 25 (noting that a crown jewel lock-up written as an “[i]ndependent agreement [is] more
likely to be upheld if [it is] not contingent on the consummation of the merger”).
140. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
141. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25.
142. See supra Part II.A.
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Apple-AuthenTec: Demonstrable Business Purpose

Apple Inc.’s (Apple) 2012 acquisition of AuthenTec, Inc.
(AuthenTec), a provider of “mobile security software licenses and
fingerprint sensor technology,” is an example of crown jewel lock-up’s
being attributed to a demonstrable business purpose.143 But that is only
part of the story. The crux of this tale involves a powerful company
(Apple) using its unique bargaining power and limited competition to
corner a much smaller company (AuthenTec) into a deal with terms
beneficial to Apple. Apple’s acquisition of AuthenTec began in late
2011 and early 2012 when AuthenTec contacted “several leading
consumer electronics companies to gauge potential market interest” in
its new fingerprint technology.144 Of the several parties contacted,
Apple was the only potential customer that expressed an interest in the
development of the technology.145 In February 2012, the officers of
both companies met to negotiate the terms for a commercial contract
regarding “the further development of this new technology.”146 During
the meetings, Apple’s representatives told the AuthenTec representatives that they were not satisfied with the financial terms within the
commercial agreement, but did make a suggestion for an acquisition of
AuthenTec.147 By May 2012, Apple had decided to propose an
acquisition of AuthenTec for $7 per share, instead of pursing a standalone commercial agreement.148 In fact, Apple made it clear that it
would no longer negotiate a commercial agreement for the technology
outside of an acquisition context.149 In addition, Apple stated that it
would not participate in an auction and that it would rescind its offer if

143. Christopher Versace, Securing the Future of Apple’s iPhones and iPads, FORBES
(Jan. 22, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/22/
securing-the-future-of-apples-iphones-and-ipads/.
144. AuthenTec, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Aug. 31, 2012)
[hereinafter AuthenTec Proxy Statement]. Although AuthenTec’s filings do not include the
names of the parties contacted, AuthenTec “counts Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, Fujitsu, HBO, HP,
Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Nokia, Orange, Samsung, Sky, and Texas Instruments among its
customers.” Matt Brian, Why Apple Really Bought AuthenTec: It Wanted “New
Technology” for Upcoming Products, and Quickly, NEXT WEB (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:52 PM),
http://thenextweb.com/apple/2012/08/16/the-real-reason-apple-acquired-authentec-becauseneeded-new-technology-quickly-products/. In the preceding two years, “multiple parties”
had contacted AuthenTec regarding “possible strategic transactions,” but those conversations
never progressed beyond the preliminary stages. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra, at 18.
145. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 18.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 19.
149. Id.
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AuthenTec were to solicit alternative proposals.150 After meeting with
outside financial and legal counsel, AuthenTec’s board allowed its
representatives to pursue a transaction with Apple for $8 a share, but
directed the representatives to seek the ability to solicit other offers
either presigning or postsigning via a go-shop provision.151 Apple
responded that it would not allow AuthenTec to pursue other
alternatives presigning nor would it agree to a go-shop provision;
however, it indicated it would allow for the customary no-shop and
fiduciary-out provisions, which would allow AuthenTec to respond to
any unsolicited offers.152 On May 9, 2012, the AuthenTec board
authorized its representatives to continue negotiations on the terms
Apple outlined, and both merger negotiations and due diligence
proceeded from May through the end of July 2012.153
On July 26, 2012, when the two parties entered into an all-cash
merger agreement, the parties simultaneously entered into an
Intellectual Property and Technology Agreement (IP Agreement).154
The IP Agreement functioned as a type of crown jewel lock-up,
according to which Apple paid $20 million in exchange for
AuthenTec’s granting Apple the right to acquire “non-exclusive,
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide license[s]” in AuthenTec hardware
and software technology and sensor patents.155 This right would
continue to exist whether or not the merger was consummated.156 To
exercise these acquisition rights, Apple was obligated to provide
AuthenTec with written notice of its intent to exercise within the 270
days following the IP Agreement’s effective date of July 26, 2012.157 If
Apple chose to exercise the hardware and patent license acquisition
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19-20.
152. Id. at 20.
153. See id. at 20-24. During May 2012, Apple conducted due diligence, and on May
30, Apple communicated its unwillingness to proceed with the acquisition due to concerns
raised through its due diligence. Id. at 20-21. These issues were resolved by July 3, 2012,
and Apple announced they would continue with the transaction in lieu of a traditional
commercial transaction. Id. at 22. AuthenTec’s board agreed to the merger transaction on
July 26, 2012, after discussion with outside financial and legal counsel. Id. at 24.
154. AuthenTec, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter
AuthenTec Current Report].
155. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 1, 2. An attorney representing Apple in Delaware litigation
relating to the transaction stated that “the only technology that is being licensed under the IP
agreement is technology relating to the 2-D project, the two-dimensional fingerprint
verification product that Apple and AuthenTec were in the process of developing.”
Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To Expedite Proceedings at 18-19, In re AuthenTec, Inc.
S’holder Litig., No. 7735-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2013).
156. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1.
157. AuthenTec Current Report, supra note 154, exhibit 10.1, at 1, 12.
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right, Apple was obligated to pay a total of $90 million to AuthenTec.158
If Apple chose to exercise the software and patent license acquisition
right, it was obligated to pay a total of $25 million to AuthenTec.159
Once AuthenTec received these payments, Apple did not owe any other
payments. Thus, the license rights did not provide any ongoing
income to AuthenTec. Due to the one-time nature of the payments, the
IP Agreement acted as a type of crown jewel lock-up because
AuthenTec was in essence selling the technology to Apple.
With the IP Agreement appearing to be a type of “crown jewel
lock-up,” the AuthenTec Board made sure to document, in its proxy
statement, the independent business reasons for recommending that
the stockholders vote to approve the IP Agreement.160 Specifically, the
proxy statement stated that the AuthenTec board believed that the IP
Agreement “would provide significant value to any third party seeking
to make an acquisition proposal,” stating further that “the successful
integration into Apple’s products . . . would increase demand for
[AuthenTec’s] technologies and products from third parties.”161 Not
everyone agreed with the AuthenTec board’s opinion that the IP
Agreement would entice third parties to make an acquisition proposal
for AuthenTec. For example, in his N.Y. Times DealBook “Deal
Professor” column, Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon explained that
the likely impact of the IP Agreement would be to “severely
discourage” third-party jumping bids.162 He explained that because
“Apple is such a dominant force in the electronics world and would no
longer need to license or buy AuthenTec’s products, it would make any
acquisition less worthwhile.”163 As described previously, this was the
case because Apple’s license acquisition rights were one-time
payments and did not provide ongoing income to AuthenTec. Hence
even though the licenses were nonexclusive, it was as if the technology
had been sold to Apple.

158. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 5. The $90 million payment was split up such that $72 million
was due thirty days after the date on which Apple sent AuthenTec written notice and the other
$18 million was due in four $4.5 million installments. Id.
159. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 8. The $25 million payment was split up such that $20 million
was due thirty days after Apple provided written notice to AuthenTec and $5 million was due
in four $1.25 million installments. Id.
160. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 25-28.
161. Id. at 26-27.
162. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Apple’s Quiet Deal for AuthenTec, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:36 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/apples-quietdeal-for-authentec/.
163. Id.
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Professor Davidoff Solomon was not the only person to hold this
view of the acquisition. By August 30, 2012, stockholders filed
thirteen putative class-action suits against AuthenTec, members of
AuthenTec’s Board, and Apple, nine of which were filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery.164
The suits sought to enjoin
consummation of the merger and performance of certain obligations
under the IP Agreement and, among other things, alleged that the
AuthenTec board had breached its fiduciary duties “by failing to
maximize stockholder value and by failing to disclose material
information.”165 During a hearing on a motion to expedite in Delaware,
the defendants argued that calling the IP Agreement a crown jewel
lock-up was a “misnomer” because it did not involve crown jewel
assets and further that “it didn’t lock anything up and it didn’t lock
anybody out.”166 In response, Vice Chancellor Parsons stated that the
determination of whether the case involved a crown jewel lock-up
turned on two issues.167 First, the importance of the patents must be
weighed against AuthenTec’s other intellectual property, a balancing
determination that the court was unable to make based on the existing
record.168 Parsons noted that the patents had to be somewhat important
simply “given the nature of the alternative agreement . . . Apple has
entered into regarding them.”169 Second, he noted that although the
licenses were nonexclusive, the court must determine the “impact” the
licenses may have on third parties who may be considering a jumping
bid.170 This was also an issue that the court could not determine based
on the existing record.171 Parsons compared the option to a reverse
164. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 10. The remaining suits were
filed in the state of Florida. Final resolution of those cases is unclear, but the following is
clear: on March 19, 2013, one of the suits filed in the Florida Eighteenth Judicial Circuit
Court for Brevard County was dismissed, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal. See Brown v. AuthenTec, Inc., 109 So. 3d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013) (unpublished table decision). The plaintiffs in the remaining Florida cases filed a
motion to expedite on August 2, 2012, which the defendants opposed; the defendants also
moved to dismiss or stay the Florida cases. See AuthenTec Defendants’ Brief in Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Proceedings, In re AuthenTec, Inc. S’holder Litig., No.
7735-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2015). The Florida court declined to stay the cases, and the
plaintiffs then filed a motion for preliminary injunction on September 5, 2012. Id. As of
September 17, 2012, a preliminary injunction hearing had not been set. Id.
165. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 46.
166. Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To Expedite Proceedings, supra note 155, at
17.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 18.
169. Id. at 17-18.
170. Id. at 18.
171. See id.
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termination fee, in that Apple would be paying a fee if the deal
between Apple and AuthenTec did not close.172 Once Apple paid the
fee, it would have the rights to the technology.173 Although Parsons did
not pass judgment on whether the agreements amounted to a crown
jewel lock-up, he did say that he believed the agreement would “have
some impact on the value, the marketability, of AuthenTec, or at least
there is a colorable claim to that effect.”174 He ultimately denied the
motion to expedite, and by November 25, 2013, the nine Delaware
Court of Chancery suits had been dismissed with prejudice, without
the court’s addressing the merits or validity of the crown jewel lockup.175
Vice Chancellor Parsons’ treatment of the Apple-AuthenTec
transaction likely has limited precedential value because he was ruling
on a motion to expedite, and thus he did not have a complete record
before him. At the same time, however, Parsons’ ruling sends a mixed
message. As an all-cash transaction, the Apple-AuthenTec deal should
be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny under Revlon, and any deal
protection devices, including a crown jewel lock-up, would also be
subject to enhanced scrutiny (no matter if that scrutiny is under Revlon
or Unocal). But it is unclear from Parsons’ ruling if he was applying
enhanced scrutiny or would apply enhanced scrutiny to a full record.
Parsons seems to have sidestepped the issue by stating that he could
not determine on the limited record whether the agreement was in fact
a crown jewel lock-up. This sends a message that although the
transaction may be an all-cash, Revlon transaction, enhanced scrutiny
may only apply if a particular deal provision were deemed to be a deal
protection device. By recognizing that the patents had to be at least
somewhat important given the fact that the parties had entered into a
specific agreement and by stating that the agreement had to have at
least “some impact on value,” Parsons came close to ruling that the IP
Agreement was a crown jewel lock-up, but then punted the issue.
Accordingly, it is unclear whether enhanced scrutiny applies or
whether the more deferential business judgment rule applies. In any
event, the Apple-AuthenTec transaction provides an example of parties
attributing what is likely a crown jewel lock-up to a demonstrable
172. See id. at 20.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 21.
175. See id. at 37 (denying the motion to expedite); AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra
note 144 (stating that three of the lawsuits filed in Delaware were voluntarily dismissed with
prejudice); In re AuthenTec, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7735-VCP, 2013 WL 6180252 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 25, 2013).
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business purpose in an attempt to avoid the agreement being classified
as a crown jewel lock-up and presumably hoping to obtain deferential
treatment.
2.

NYSE-ICE: Crown Jewel Lock-ups as Stand-Alone Agreements

Another popular argument that attempts to justify lock-ups is that
the lock-up agreement could be a stand-alone agreement, separate and
independent from the merger. The merger of NYSE Euronext (NYSE)
and IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (ICE), is an example of a
transaction in which this argument has been used to justify a lock-up.
Before entering into a merger agreement with ICE, NYSE had
attempted to engage in another potential transaction that fell through,
paving the way for a merger with ICE. That first transaction was
announced on February 15, 2011, and was a “merger of equals”
between NYSE and Deutsche Börse AG.176
Following that
announcement, on April 1, 2011, NYSE received an offer from ICE
and NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. (NASDAQ), offering to buy all the
outstanding shares of NYSE common stock for a mixture of cash and
NASDAQ and ICE common stock.177 NASDAQ and ICE hoped to
merge the “two biggest stock exchange operators in the United States”
and create synergies in a competitive marketplace.178 On April 11, the
NYSE board of directors rejected the offer from NASDAQ and ICE
and reaffirmed the potential transaction with Deutsche Börse AG.179
On April 19, 2011, NASDAQ and ICE sent NYSE a letter with
more details regarding their offer; however, NYSE’s board rejected the
offer again, with concern that the NASDAQ and ICE proposal would
not receive regulatory approval.180 On May 16, 2011, ICE and
NASDAQ issued a press release, stating that they would not pursue an
acquisition of NYSE due to regulatory concerns.181 On February 1,
2012, the European Commission prohibited the transaction between
NYSE and Deutsche Börse AG due to anticompetitive concerns, and
the parties subsequently terminated their agreement.182 During
176. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 77 (Apr. 30,
2013) [hereinafter IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement].
177. Id.
178. Michael J. de la Merced, Nasdaq and ICE Make Hostile Bid for NYSE Euronext,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/nasdaq-ice-make-hostilebid-for-nyse-euronext/ (last updated Apr. 1, 2011, 8:02 PM).
179. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 77.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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September 2012, the CEOs of NYSE and ICE met sporadically and
discussed the possibility of a transaction between ICE and NYSE.183
On September 13, ICE’s board of directors gave ICE’s CEO
permission to explore a potential transaction with NYSE.184 That same
day, the NYSE board met to discuss possible strategic alternatives.185
The NYSE board evaluated a stand-alone strategy and reviewed
potential partners for other potential transactions.186 Furthermore, the
board considered the separation or sale of its businesses, including its
European derivatives business or its continental European cash-trading
and listings business.187 The board ultimately decided to pursue
A mutual
potential opportunities regarding these options.188
confidentiality agreement was signed on October 5, 2012, which
ultimately led to the final merger agreement between the parties on
December 20, 2012.189 Pursuant to the merger agreement, NYSE
shareholders would receive approximately 67% stock and 33% cash.190
The same day that ICE and NYSE entered into a merger
agreement, their subsidiaries simultaneously entered into a Clearing
and Financial Intermediary Services Agreement (Clearing Services
Agreement).191 Under the terms of the Clearing Services Agreement,
ICE Clear Europe Limited (ICE Clear), a wholly owned subsidiary of
ICE, agreed to provide London International Financial Futures and
Options Exchange (LIFFE) Administration and Management, a wholly
owned subsidiary of NYSE, clearing services for LIFFE’s London
derivatives trading market.192 In exchange, LIFFE agreed to pay ICE
Clear certain fixed clearing service costs “plus an applicable
margin.”193 LIFFE also agreed to provide financial intermediary
services to ICE Clear.194 The Clearing Services Agreement was a
stand-alone agreement, which would go into effect whether or not the
merger was consummated.195 On July 2, 2013, NYSE and ICE
183. Id.
184. Id. at 78.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 78, 85.
190. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Dec. 20 2012)
[hereinafter IntercontinentalExchange Current Report].
191. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 85.
192. Id. at 85, 128.
193. Id. at 128.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 129.
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announced completion of the clearing transition of NYSE LIFFE’s
London derivatives market to ICE Clear Europe.196
In a joint ICE-NYSE definitive proxy statement dated April 30,
2012, the two boards of directors acknowledged the concern that
certain provisions of the merger agreement and the Clearing Services
Agreement might discourage third parties from submitting superior
bids to acquire NYSE, either during the preclosing period or if the deal
was terminated prior to closing.197 Despite this concern, both the ICE
and NYSE boards recommended that the shareholders of each
company approve the transactions because of the substantial costsaving synergies for both entities.198 For ICE, the Clearing Services
Agreement would “see ICE make [its] mark in the European clearing
space and lay down the gauntlet for competition.”199 For NYSE, the
agreement would eliminate nearly $80 million in costs associated with
NYSE’s development of its own clearing house, as well as the risk that
NYSE would have a difficult time creating its own internal clearing
house after the announcement of the ICE transaction.200 Even if the
merger between ICE and NYSE was not consummated, NYSE was
guaranteed clearing of its European futures trades.201
Once ICE and NYSE announced the execution of the merger
agreement, a total of thirteen putative stockholder class action
complaints were filed.202 All complaints included similar allegations
concerning the NYSE board of directors’ breach of the fiduciary
duties of both care and loyalty.203 They specifically alleged that both
the merger agreement and the Clearing Services Agreement included
preclusive deal protection provisions that had deterred third-party
bidders from submitting competitive offers for NYSE.204 In the
Delaware Court of Chancery, then-Chancellor Strine found that the
deal protection provisions were not preclusive because there was “no
196. See Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., ICE Clear Europe Completes
Clearing Transition of NYSE Liffe Derivatives Contracts (July 2, 2013), http://ir.theice.
com/tools/viewpdf.aspx?page={5E4147A8-B609-4035-AF46-25D656E52C38}.
197. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 40.
198. Id. at 87, 101.
199. ICE Deal Ends Liffe’s Clearing Countdown, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD (Dec.
21, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.fow.com/3134319/ICE-deal-ends-Liffes-clearingcountdown.html.
200. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 87.
201. Nina Mehta & Nandini Sukumar, IntercontinentalExchange To Acquire NYSE
for $8.2 Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 20, 2012, 8:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-12-20/intercontinentalexchange-said-in-merger-talks-with-nyse-euronext.html.
202. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 160.
203. Id.
204. Id.

572

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:545

evidence in the record that presents a barrier to any serious acquirer.”205
Strine found it undisputed that the Clearing Services Agreement was
crucial to NYSE, which would have a difficult time implementing its
own clearing services. He specifically stated, “So that issue of the socalled crown jewel isn’t there.”206 In reaching this conclusion, Strine
placed a particular emphasis on the lack of other deal partners in
existence. Specifically, he noted that NYSE was unable to get a deal
done with Deutsche Börse AG, and he further stated that the plaintiffs’
suggestion that NYSE could get a deal done with the NASDAQ was
“sort of . . . funny to” him.207 Then-Chancellor Strine further noted that
if another person wanted to do a deal with NYSE, it could “play Let’s
Make a Deal with ICE and you buy them out of that contract or,
frankly, you just make clear to them [that] they better be a great
clearinghouse.”208 Accordingly, Strine was of the opinion that the
Clearing Services Agreement did not amount to a crown jewel lockup.209
Like Vice Chancellor Parsons’ opinion in the Apple-AuthenTec
case, Strine’s treatment of the agreement in this case sends a mixed
message as to the proper standard of review regarding lock-ups. The
67% stock/33% cash consideration in this case likely would not trigger
Revlon, but deal protection devices are presumably still subject to an
enhanced level of scrutiny.210 At first glance, Strine appears to have
been applying an enhanced-scrutiny standard by finding that the deal
protection devices, including the crown jewel lock-up, were not
preclusive. But then he went on to state that the Clearing Services
Agreement was not a crown jewel lock-up because it did not preclude
any bidders. There is a “chicken and the egg” problem with this
analysis. If the agreement was not a crown jewel lock-up, then it was
not a deal protection device and thus not subject to enhanced scrutiny
(i.e., the preclusiveness and coerciveness inquiry under Unocal).211
Maybe Strine was saying that the agreement is a crown jewel lock-up,
but that it is not a preclusive crown jewel lock-up. In any event, the
205. In re NYSE Euronext S’holders Litig., No. 8136-CS, slip op. at 1, 12 (Del. Ch.
May 10, 2013).
206. Id. at 13.
207. Id. at 11.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 65, 70-71 (Del.
1995) (finding that a transaction consisting of 33% cash consideration did not trigger
Revlon).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42 for a description of the application of
the Unocal enhanced scrutiny test and its application to deal protection devices.
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opinion is unclear and likely leaves practitioners in a conundrum as to
how to negotiate crown jewel lock-ups.
3.

Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales: A Modern Crown Jewel LockUp with Traditional Roots

Of the modern crown jewel lock-ups, Pacific Rubiales Energy
Corporation’s (Pacific Rubiales) acquisition of Petrominerales Limited
(Pretrominerales) is the most similar to the traditional crown jewel
lock-ups of the 1980s. In January 2012, Petrominerales “concluded
that prevailing market conditions” could lead to unsolicited acquisition
offers for its operations and subsequently hired TD Securities to help it
identify potential acquisition partners and provide advice for any
potential transactions.212 From January to August 2012, Petrominerales
received several unsolicited offers, including an offer from Pacific
Rubiales, which led Petrominerales to have its financial advisor
prepare a data room and invite a select number of parties to enter into
confidentiality and standstill agreements.213 From September 2012 to
February 2013, seven parties, not including Pacific Rubiales, entered
into confidentiality agreements with Petrominerales and proceeded to
conduct due diligence.214 One of those parties submitted an offer, but
Petrominerales and that party were unable to come to an agreement on
the terms of the transaction.215
In June 2013, Petrominerales determined that access to the data
room and interactions with potential parties would not likely result in a
strategic transaction, and thus Petrominerales closed its data room and
ceased all active discussions with potential parties.216 In August 2013,
Pacific Rubiales reached out to Petrominerales to discuss the potential
for a transaction and submitted an offer for an all-cash transaction.217
From August to September 2013, Petrominerales renewed discussions
with the other parties who had previously signed confidentiality
agreements.218 On September 16, 2013, Pacific Rubiales submitted a
second, revised nonbinding expression of interest to Petrominerales,

212. Petrominerales, Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, ALVOPETRO 19 (Oct.
29, 2013), http://www.alvopetro.com/files/galleries/Print_Circular_Petrominerales_OCT
291939.pdf [hereinafter Petrominerales Information Circular].
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 19-20.
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and subsequent negotiations were held.219
The next day,
Petrominerales’ board of directors met to review potential transactions
with various parties, including Pacific Rubiales.220 At that meeting, the
board directed the management to negotiate with an eye towards
completing a transaction with Pacific Rubiales.221 On September 18,
2013, both parties signed a letter of intent and commenced
negotiations on the terms of the transaction.222
On September 29, 2013, Pacific Rubiales announced that it had
entered into an “Arrangement Agreement” with Petrominerales for a
cash-only acquisition of all of its current and outstanding stock.223 The
agreement proposed a cash-for-stock acquisition, with Pacific
Rubiales paying for each Petrominerales common share CAD$11 cash
and one common share of a newly formed exploration and production
The Arrangement Agreement was detailed in
company.224
Petrominerales’ Information Circular and stated that Pacific Rubiales
made an irrevocable offer to purchase “Midstream Assets.”225 Specific
details of the offer are limited regarding its exact terms, which were set
forth in a disclosure letter that is not available for public disclosure.226
The Midstream Assets offer had been in the works since May
2013, when Petrominerales “commenced a formal process to pursue
opportunities to monetize certain of its Midstream Assets.”227 The
Midstream Assets included “Petrominerales’ transport rights in the
OCENSA Pipeline; . . . Petrominerales’ 9.65% equity interest and
transport rights in the OBC Pipeline”; and “Petrominerales’ 5% equity
interest in the OCENSA Pipeline,” which is located in Colombia.228
Due to Colombia’s “rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure,” the
pipeline assets were particularly valuable because they are “the only
cost effective method of transporting crude in a country that is now
Latin America’s fourth largest oil producer.”229
219. Id. at 20.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Press Release, Pac. Rubiales Energy Corp., Pacific Rubiales Announces Strategic
Acquisition of Petrominerales (Sept. 29, 2013), http://sedar.com/DisplayCompanyDocu
ments.do?long=EN&issuerNO=00007953 (select “Sept. 29, 2013” entry).
224. Id.
225. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra note 212, at 27.
226. Id. app. C, art. 9.5.
227. Id. at 27.
228. Id. at 15, 17.
229. Matt Smith, What Does the Pacific Rubiales Acquisition of Petrominerales Mean
for Investors?, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.fool.ca/2013/10/30/what-does-thepacific-rubiales-acquisition-of-petrominerales-mean-for-investors-2/.
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This crown jewel lock-up was different from the traditional lockup in that the target company, Petrominerales, could accept the offer
(but did not have to) if the acquisition with Pacific Rubiales was “not
completed by December 10, 2013 for any reason.”230 Moreover, unlike
the traditional lock-up, which typically binds the target to sell the
assets to the optionholder if the target enters into an agreement with
another buyer, Petrominerales was not bound to the agreement were
another offer to emerge for its stake in the OCENSA pipeline.231
However, Petrominerales could not enter into another agreement
without the consent of Pacific Rubiales.232 If no other offer presented
itself, however, Pacific Rubiales was obligated to purchase the
Midstream Assets if Petrominerales accepted the irrevocable offer.233
This modified crown jewel lock-up provided cash to Petrominerales,
which had seen its cash flow drop 45% in the preceding year due to
lower oil prices, but it also dissuaded other buyers from bidding for
Petrominerales’ oil assets.234
Unlike the preceding transactions, the Pacific RubialesPetrominerales transaction was not litigated, and thus it is not clear
how a court would address a similarly structured transaction in the
future. The next Subpart, however, does provide some guidance to
230. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra note 212, at 27.
231. Id.
232. Id. app. C, art. 6.1(5)(a). Such consent was “not to be unreasonably withheld.”

Id.
233. Id. app. C, art. 9.5.
234. Liz Hoffman, Norton Rose Reps Pacific Rubiales in $1.5B Energy Co. Buy,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2013, 11:26 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/476615/norton-rosereps-pacific-rubiales-in-1-5b-energy-co-buy (subscription required). As of the date of the
Information Circular, no shareholder suits had been instituted against Petrominerales or
Pacific Rubiales at the time of the acquisition. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra
note 212, app. C, sched. D, § (r). The acquisition closed on November 28, 2013, and a month
later, Pacific Rubiales sold the 5% equity interest in the OCENSA pipeline it had obtained in
the Petrominerales acquisition to Darby Private Equity, an arm of Franklin Templeton
Investments, for US$385 million and retained a long-term agreement for transportation of its
oil production in the same pipeline. Press Release, Pac. Rubiales Energy Corp., Pacific
Rubiales Announces Closing of U.S.$385 Million Sale of its OCENSA Pipeline Interest (Apr.
1, 2014), http://sedar.com/DisplayCompanyDocuments.do?long-EN&issuerNo=00007953
(select “April 1, 2014” entry). Pacific Rubiales sold the OCENSA pipeline to pay down the
debt from the Petrominerales acquisition, a US$400 million balance outstanding on
Petrominerales’ U.S. dollar revolving credit facility; it gained additional transportation
capacity through a secure pipeline in Colombia. Pac. Rubiales Energy Corp., Management
Discussion and Analysis, PAC. ENERGY 4 (May 8, 2014), http://www.pacific.energy/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/2014/financial%20reports/q1/PRE%20MD&A%20Q1%202
014.pdf; Press Release, Pac. Rubiales Energy Corp., Pacific Rubiales Announces $385
Million Sale of OCENSA Pipeline Interest (Dec. 23, 2013) http://sedar.com/Display
CompanyDocuments.do?long-EN&issuerNo=00007953 (select “Dec. 23, 2013” entry).
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practitioners on the possible use of crown jewel lock-ups in a sale of a
financially distressed company.

B.

Crown Jewel Lock-Ups and the Financially Distressed Company

A number of commentators have cited to the 2012 BGI-Shenzen
(BGI)-Complete Genomics merger as yet another example of a
modern crown jewel lock-up providing benefits to the target company
separate and apart from the merger.235 As this Subpart details, however,
the option in that transaction was not a crown jewel lock-up option, but
rather a stock option. This Article nevertheless contends that the BGIComplete Genomics transaction and the resulting Delaware
jurisprudence stemming from this transaction set the foundation for
using crown jewel lock-ups in transactions when the target is
financially distressed. Although BGI-Complete Genomics involved a
stock option, the arguments advanced in support of the deal structure
are transferable to crown jewel lock-ups.
The merger of Complete Genomics and BGI began on June 5,
2012, when Complete Genomics retained Jefferies as its financial
advisor to help it review strategic alternatives, including the possibility
of a merger.236 Jefferies contacted forty-two parties, of which nine
parties executed confidentiality agreements.237 The board then
requested interested parties to submit nonbinding proposals.238 Of the
nine parties who had executed confidentiality agreements, two
submitted nonbinding proposals regarding a transaction and four
indicated their interest in an equity investment.239 Negotiations
“quickly focused on the two transactional proposals,” a period of
negotiations with both parties ensued, and then one of the two parties
requested exclusivity.240 On June 15, 2012, Jefferies instructed BGI
that written, nonbinding, preliminary proposals for a transaction
involving the sale of the company should be submitted by June 29,
2012.241 BGI signed a confidentiality agreement on June 19, 2012, and
235. See, e.g., Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
236. Complete Genomics, Inc., Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO-T), exhibit
99.(A)(1)(A)), at 14 (Sept. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Complete Genomics Tender Offer
Statement].
237. In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7888-VCL, slip op. at 7-8
(Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012).
238. Id. at 8.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Complete Genomics Tender Offer Statement, supra note 236, exhibit
99.(A)(1)(A), at 14.
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received a management presentation on Complete Genomics.242 On
July 3, 2012, BGI submitted a written, nonbinding preliminary
proposal to acquire Complete Genomics, and BGI was later informed
that a final written proposal was due by July 31, 2012.243
During July 2012, BGI conducted research and due diligence on
Complete Genomics, and it ultimately asked for additional time to
submit its final written proposal, which was granted.244 On August 6,
2012, BGI submitted a nonbinding proposal to acquire Complete
Genomics.245 Complete Genomics’ management and financial and
legal advisors reviewed the proposed agreement and provided BGI
with a term sheet for bridge financing.246 On August 29, 2012, BGI
provided a letter from a financial entity in China stating that the entity
would finance the transaction for $3.15 a share; however, on August
31, BGI provided another letter from the Export-Import Bank of
China, stating that it would also finance the acquisition for $3.15 a
share.247 BGI’s financial advisors decided that the Export-Import Bank
of China would be a better lender for the proposed transaction.248 On
September 15, 2012, the parties executed and delivered the all-cash
merger agreement, representing a transaction value of nearly $117.6
million, and issued a press release regarding the acquisition on
September 17, 2012.249
On the same date the parties executed the merger agreement,
Complete Genomics, BGI, and BGI-HONGKONG Co. (BGIHONGKONG), a wholly owned subsidiary of BGI, entered into a
Convertible Subordinated Promissory Note (Note).250 Under the terms
of the Note, BGI-HONGKONG, the lender, agreed to loan Complete
Genomics, the borrower, up to an aggregate amount of $30 million to
be used “solely for working capital and capital expenditure
requirements in the ordinary course of business.”251
The Note was structured so that the “first draw” of $6 million
would occur on October 1, 2012.252 Thereafter, beginning in November
242. Id.
243. Id. at 14-15.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 16.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 17; Complete Genomics, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1
(Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Complete Genomics Current Report].
250. Complete Genomics Current Report, supra note 249, exhibit 99.1.
251. Id. exhibit 10.2, § 3(e).
252. Id. exhibit 10.2, § 3(a).
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2012, Complete Genomics could request funding of $6 million per
month by giving written request to BGI-HONGKONG no fewer than
three days prior to the “requested funding date.”253 The Note included
certain conditions, including that “the Merger Agreement has not been
terminated and remains a valid and binding obligation of the parties
thereto.”254 The Note also gave Complete Genomics certain conversion
and registration rights, pursuant to which BGI-HONGKONG had the
right to convert the principal and interest due into common stock of
Complete Genomics at the offer price.255 BGI-HONGKONG had the
right to exercise this conversion right either upon termination of the
Merger Agreement or upon a change of control of Complete
Genomics.256 If BGI-HONGKONG were to exercise its conversion
rights, it could own up to 22% of Complete Genomics’ stock.257
Shareholders brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
seeking to enjoin the merger between Complete Genomics and BGI.258
The shareholders argued that the Complete Genomics board had
breached its fiduciary duties by implementing certain deal protection
provisions into the merger agreement.259 Although Vice Chancellor
Laster enjoined the “don’t ask, don’t waive” standstill provision in a
potential bidder’s confidentiality agreement with Complete Genomics,
he did not enjoin the merger between Complete Genomics and BGI.260
Laster stated that the combination of the deal protection provisions and
the bridge loan made the question of whether the merger agreement
was preclusive a closer case.261 Ultimately, however, Laster was able to
distinguish the bridge loan from the stock option in Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. on the ground that the
bridge loan provided a “substantial benefit” to Complete Genomics
because of the company’s need for immediate cash.262 Laster
recognized that the stock option in QVC “didn’t provide any benefit to
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. exhibit 10.2, § 4(a).
256. Id.
257. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
258. Complete Genomics Tender Offer Statement, supra note 236, amend. no. 1, at 2.
259. In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP 1 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_
In_re_Complete_Genomics_Inc_Shareholder_Litigation.pdf.
260. See id. at 4. For a detailed description of “don’t ask, don’t waive” standstills, see
Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a
Sale of Corporate Control, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 521 (2013).
261. See In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7888-VCL, slip op. at 16
(Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012).
262. Id.
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the target and only came into play in the event of a topping bid.”263
Thus, Laster found that although the bridge loan (a crown jewel lockup) could be preclusive in other contexts, the fact that it provided a
benefit to the target company in this particular transaction made it a
nonpreclusive deal protection device.264 Accordingly, he refused to
grant a preliminary injunction.265
Although, as earlier stated, the Complete Genomics option was a
stock lock-up, not an asset lock-up, Laster’s reasoning potentially sets
the groundwork for upholding asset lock-ups under similar
circumstances. Like the Supreme Court of New York in Bear Stearns,
which emphasized the “financial catastrophe confronting Bear
Stearns,”266 Laster focused on the “highly fragile state” of Complete
Genomics in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction in In re
Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.267 Moreover, he
emphasized that granting a preliminary injunction without a topping
bid present would be imprudent because it could risk the current
deal.268 Although it is clear that Complete Genomics’ economic state
was far from healthy and it is completely possible a topping bid had
not emerged due to Complete Genomics’ “fragile state,” it is equally
possible that a topping bid had not emerged due to the deterrent effects
of the lock-up. Nonetheless, courts appear inclined to uphold lock-ups
when an argument can be made that the target company is financially
unwell.269 The parameters of how unwell a company must be for a
court to uphold a lock-up have yet to be determined.
IV. MODERN CROWN JEWEL LOCK-UPS: A PASSING FAD, AN
ENDURING CLASSIC, OR A FLEECING OF SHAREHOLDER
VALUE?
The revival of crown jewel lock-ups in recent transactions renews
the debate from the 1980s regarding the validity of lock-ups. Unlike
the courts in the 1980s, today’s courts have not yet enjoined the
modern crown jewel lock-ups.270 Consequently, it remains to be seen
whether the modern crown jewel lock-up is a passing fad or an
enduring classic.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 17.
In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 735 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
Complete Genomics, slip op. at 17.
See id.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d 709.

580

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:545

Modern lock-ups appear to differ in some material respects from
their predecessors. The most significant difference is that, thus far,
today’s lock-ups have only appeared in negotiated transactions, rather
than in hostile transactions where they were typically combined with
other defensive mechanisms such as poison pills and white knights.271
The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon even noted that economic
conditions in the 1980s were such that enticing a white knight to enter
a bidding war required “some form of compensation to cover the risks
and costs involved.”272 Although hostile transactions are on the rise,
amicable transactions remain the hallmark of today’s economic
environment.273 As a result, modern lock-ups have morphed in the
more harmonious environment in which they are being used.
Another significant difference is that the 1980s case law has
influenced dealmakers and their practices.274 Dealmakers have been
careful to document the decision process leading up to the lock-up.275
In doing so, dealmakers have taken almost painstaking steps to
differentiate today’s lock-ups from the lock-ups of the 1980s and have
attempted to make clear that the lock-ups could be stand-alone
transactions or have business purposes separate and apart from the
merger transactions themselves.276
Dealmakers’ preoccupation with issues such as whether the lockup can be attributed to another business purpose or can be a standalone transaction from the merger is misplaced. Although at first
glance these modern lock-ups can appear benign and different from
their 1980s predecessors, today’s lock-ups do not differ greatly from
their predecessors. The saying “everything old becomes new again”
holds true for today’s lock-ups. Although today’s lock-ups have
271. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Cottle is an excellent example of the hostile
transactions of the 1980s in which lock-ups arose and were analyzed. The court noted, “This
is a shareholder derivative action involving white knights, poison pills, shark repellants,
stalking horses, crown jewels, hello fees, goodbye fees and asset lock-up options.” Cottle v.
Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 572 (11th Cir. 1988); see also In re Holly Farms Corp.
S’holders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (noting that the
plaintiffs were not only seeking to enjoin a lock-up, but also were seeking “to compel Holly
Farms to redeem its stock rights plan”).
272. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del.
1986).
273. See David Gelles, Hostile Takeover Bids for Big Firms Across Industries Make a
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 12, 2014, 8:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/06/12/hostile-takeover-bids-for-big-firms-across-industries-make-a-comeback
(describing an increase in hostile transactions in 2014).
274. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 7.
275. For an example of this documentation, see supra Part III.A.1.
276. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2.
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evolved into more sophisticated transactions as a result of historical
precedents, economic development, and outside socio-political
influences, at the heart of the matter, modern lock-ups are the same as
their 1980s predecessors.

A. The Family Jewels
The lock-ups of the 1980s concerned some of the most
significant and valuable assets of the target company, typically
divisions of the target. For example, the Revlon lock-up was for the
company’s Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions.277
Similarly, the Macmillan lock-up involved eight Macmillan
subsidiaries,278 while the Hanson lock-up pertained to SCM’s Pigments
and Consumer Foods businesses.279 Likewise, the Cottle lock-up gave
KKR the right to purchase either Storer’s cable stations or its television
stations,280 and the Holly Farms lock-up provided ConAgra the right to
purchase Holly Farms’ “prime poultry operations.”281
Like their predecessors, modern lock-ups still concern some of
the most significant and valuable assets of the target company. Unlike
their predecessors, however, today’s lock-ups generally do not involve
subsidiaries or divisions, but rather technology or other rights. For
example, AuthenTec granted Apple the right to acquire “non-exclusive,
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide license[s]” in AuthenTec hardware
and software technology and sensor patents.282 The technology and
patents went to the heart of AuthenTec’s business, which developed
and provided “mobile security software licenses and fingerprint sensor
technology.”283 Although these licenses were nonexclusive, the effect
of the licenses was exclusivity because Apple no longer had to buy or
license AuthenTec technology. Once Apple made the payments as
required under the IP Agreement, Apple no longer owed any
consideration; the agreement did not provide ongoing income to
AuthenTec. In addition, although the licenses were nonexclusive, there
were likely no other companies interested in licensing the technology.
This much was evident from AuthenTec’s initial search for a company
277. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
278. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1275 (Del. 1989).
279. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 270 (2d Cir.
1986).
280. Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1988).
281. In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, at *2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
282. AuthenTec Current Report, supra note 154, exhibit 10.1, at 1, 2.
283. Versace, supra note 143.
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with which to partner to develop the technology. Thus, the money
AuthenTec could make from the technology was likely to come from
Apple. But AuthenTec essentially sold the technology to Apple, which
meant that in the long run, AuthenTec would not enjoy that stream of
income. Accordingly, when evaluating AuthenTec as a takeover target,
AuthenTec’s value would be greatly diminished.284
I must note, however, that this is not to say that every mergeragreement-related intellectual property agreement should be classified
as a crown jewel lock-up. Instead, the business effects of the
agreement must be evaluated, as well as the relationship between the
agreement and any merger agreements. The unique aspects of each
business and transaction must be considered, as well as the preceding
sale process (if the company is in Revlon-mode) and the deterrent
effects of the intellectual property agreement on other potential
bidders.
Similarly to the Apple-AuthenTec deal, Petrominerales granted
Pacific Rubiales an option to purchase Petrominerales’ equity and
transportation rights in certain pipelines located in Colombia.285 This
option was particularly valuable because the pipeline was the most
efficient manner in which to transport oil in Colombia, a country
whose transportation infrastructure is lacking.286 Pacific Rubiales
announced that these equity and transportation rights would help it to
cut costs on transportation of some of its crude oil.287 Like the options
of old, this option worked to deter “competing buyer[s] from cherrypicking Petrominerales’ oilfield assets.”288 But unlike the options of
old, if a competing bid emerged for these assets, Petrominerales was
not bound to sell the assets to Pacific Rubiales.289 Despite this unique
out, the option still had the potential to deter bidders because bidders
who were only willing to buy all of the Petrominerales assets subject to
284. Although the courts never ultimately ruled on whether the agreement amounted
to a crown jewel lock-up, Vice Chancellor Parsons was of the belief that the agreement would
have “some impact on the value” of AuthenTec. Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To
Expedite Proceedings, supra note 155, at 21.
285. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra note 212, app. C, art. 9.5.
286. See Press Release, Pac. Rubiales Energy Corp., supra note 223.
287. Peter Murphy & Nelson Bocanegra, Petrominerales Colombia Shares Surge on
Takeover by Pacific Rubiales, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2013, 4:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/09/30/us-pacificrubiales-petrominerales-idUSBRE98T12Z20130930 (“Greater
access to pipelines would also reduce its spending on more expensive road haulage to
transport some of its crude, the company said, as well significantly increase its exploration
and production acreage.”).
288. Hoffman, supra note 234.
289. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra note 212, app. C, art. 9.5.
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the lock-up would likely not be as attractive as Pacific Rubiales, who
was bound to buy all the assets. Moreover, in order to be competitive,
bidders would have to offer at least a little bit more than the
Petrominerales offer for all of the Midstream Assets.
The NYSE-ICE transaction is the most unlike the traditional
crown jewel lock-up. Instead of acquiring an asset of the target
company (here, NYSE), the acquirer (here, ICE) provided services to
the target in exchange for a fixed fee plus a margin of the services.290
This agreement remained in place even if the proposed merger were to
fall through.291 When considering the ramifications of this agreement,
it becomes clear that although the form may be different, the
substantive result is that the Clearing Services Agreement was a crown
jewel lock-up. A third party considering whether to jump the NYSEICE transaction would be forced to consider that, unless it had its own
clearing services, it most likely would be doing business with (indeed,
obtaining an essential service from) the party whose very deal it just
disrupted. Then-Chancellor Strine was of the opinion that this was not
a crown jewel lock-up because a third party could buy ICE out of its
contract or “frankly, you just make clear to them [that] they better be a
great clearinghouse.”292 From a practical perspective, this seems easier
said than done. If ICE were not a “great clearinghouse,” what would
the third party do then? The third party would be forced to take on
additional costs in creating its own clearing services or possibly find
another party to provide those clearing services. Then-Chancellor
Strine himself recognized that the Clearing Services Agreement was
crucial to NYSE because of the various approvals that would be
needed.293 Accordingly, to find that the Clearing Services Agreement
was not a crown jewel lock-up is a misstatement.
Instead, this Article contends that what then-Chancellor Strine
intended to hold was that the NYSE-ICE lock-up—while a lock-up—
was not preclusive because, as a practical matter, there were not any
viable merger partners to preclude from making a bid. NYSE had
already executed a deal with Deutsche Börse AG that fell through after
the European Commission had prohibited the transaction over
anticompetitive concerns.294 Other than ICE, it seems the one other
290.
291.
292.
10, 2013).
293.
294.

See IntercontinentalExchange Current Report, supra note 190.
IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 129.
In re NYSE Euronext S’holders Litig., No. 8136-CS, slip op. 1, 12 (Del. Ch. May
See id. at 11-12.
IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 77.
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viable strategic potential merger partner would have been NASDAQ.
NYSE had already rejected a joint offer from ICE and NASDAQ,
citing regulatory concerns.295 Apart from the fact that NYSE and
NASDAQ are direct competitors, the idea that NYSE and NASDAQ
could successfully engage in a transaction without raising any
regulatory concerns was, as then-Chancellor Strine summed up,
“funny.”296
As these cases show, dealmakers and the courts alike seem to shy
away from declaring that certain assets are crown jewels.297 This
avoidance likely stems from the 1980s jurisprudence questioning the
validity of lock-ups involving crown jewels. It is easier to say that
something is not a crown jewel asset than to wrestle with the close
scrutiny applicable to crown jewel lock-ups. In concentrating on
whether an asset is a crown jewel, dealmakers seemed to have lost
sight of the fact that the 1980s jurisprudence focused on the auction
process preceding entry into the lock-up and the role the lock-up
played within that process.

B.

The Bidding Process: A Fleecing of Shareholder Value?

Under the 1980s jurisprudence, the preceding sale process and
the target board’s actions are outcome determinative in evaluating
whether a crown jewel lock-up will be upheld. In Revlon, the
Delaware Supreme Court made clear that lock-ups would be valid
where “their adoption is untainted by director interest or other breaches
of fiduciary duty.”298 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Cottle explained
that the relevant inquiry should be whether there was a fair auction and
whether the bidder being afforded the lock-up made the best offer, not
whether the lock-up effectively ended the bidding process.299 The
courts in the 1980s were concerned with whether a target was using a
lock-up to favor one bidder over another in a manner that minimized,
not maximized, shareholder value.300 If a target used a lock-up to favor
one bidder over another, there was a potential that the target was
leaving money on the table that should instead be in the shareholders’
pockets. Accordingly, the courts in the 1980s focused on whether the
295.
296.
297.
298.
1986).
299.
300.
II.A.

Id.
NYSE Euronext, slip op. at 11.
See, e.g., id. at 13.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.

See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988).
For a description of the courts’ treatment of crown jewel lock-ups, see supra Part
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target was using a lock-up in a manner that shut down the bidding
process.301 Along these lines, the courts repeatedly stated in dicta that
if the target was using the lock-up to draw bidders into the bidding
process and to enhance shareholder value, the courts would be more
inclined to uphold those lock-ups.302 Commentators have recognized
the importance of the sale process, stating that crown jewel lock-ups
“should normally be preceded by an auction or market canvass and
would need to withstand close scrutiny.”303
Upon first glance, it would appear that target boards and their
attorneys have taken these lessons to heart and have conducted sale
processes intended to maximize stockholder value. But things are not
always as they seem, and upon a closer examination, the transactions
leading up to today’s lock-ups fall short of the sale processes
envisioned by the courts in the 1980s. The Apple-AuthenTec
transaction provides the best example of things not always being what
they seem to be. At the outset, AuthenTec contacted “several leading
consumer electronics companies” to gauge their interest in
AuthenTec’s new technology.304 Of the companies contacted, only
Apple expressed an interest in the technology and moved forward with
negotiating a commercial contract.305 The tides soon changed, however,
and Apple used the commercial contract negotiations and its
bargaining power to essentially force AuthenTec into merger
negotiations without allowing AuthenTec to otherwise test the
market.306 AuthenTec was forced into a corner—either proceed in a
lucrative deal with Apple on Apple’s terms or contact other potential
buyers and risk losing out on any and all potential transactions with
Apple.
Counsel for AuthenTec argued that the fact the lock-up arose out
of commercial agreement negotiations that “morphed into a merger
agreement cuts directly against the notion” that the lock-up was
“designed to preclude bidding, designed to preclude somebody
jumping the merger.”307 Counsel argued that the manner in which the

301. See cases cited supra note 20 (describing cases in which the courts held that a
lock-up hindered the sale process).
302. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
303. 1 KLING & NUGENT, supra note 14, § 4.04[6] n.102.
304. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 18.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 19-20.
307. Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To Expedite Proceedings, supra note 155, at
23.
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lock-up arose was “exactly the reverse of how lock-ups occur.”308 In
making that argument, however, AuthenTec’s counsel failed to
recognize that AuthenTec never engaged in an auction or a market
canvass for the entire company, or at least not to the standard
envisioned by the courts in the 1980s. Approaching customers to sell
software or to otherwise coordinate to develop software is simply not
the same as approaching those customers to sell an entire company.
As such, AuthenTec did not engage in any market check and then
found itself cornered by Apple.
Of the modern crown jewel lock-up transactions discussed in this
Article, the Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales transaction is the only one
that was preceded by a market check approaching the type envisioned
by the courts in the 1980s. In the months leading up to its transaction
with Pacific Rubiales, Petrominerales hired a financial advisor to
advise it on potential acquisition partners.309 Moreover, seven parties
executed confidentiality agreements and proceeded with due diligence,
which resulted in one party’s making an offer.310 Petrominerales
continued discussions with the parties who entered into confidentiality
agreements up to September 2013, the same month that it entered into
an agreement with Pacific Rubiales.311 Although Pacific Rubiales was
not one of the seven parties who initially entered into confidentiality
agreements and was not the one party who made an offer early in the
process, through this market canvass, the Petrominerales board should
have been able to effectively assess Petrominerales’ value and to
evaluate potential merger partners’ interests in the company. If the
courts in the 1980s had been reviewing this transaction, they most
likely would have upheld the lock-up and would have urged future
dealmakers to engage in a similar type of sale process before agreeing
to a lock-up.312

C.

Can Lock-ups Become an Enduring Classic?

Despite some alterations, modern crown jewel lock-ups are not
materially different from their 1980s predecessors. A limited number
of recent deals have included lock-ups, and it remains to be seen
whether more dealmakers will follow this trend and incorporate these
308. Id.
309. Petrominerales Information Circular, supra note 212, at 19.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 19-20.
312. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576-77 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the lock-up was valid because it aided the auction process).
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devices into their future transactions or whether they will continue to
be deterred by the 1980s jurisprudence.
Although limited modern case law addresses crown jewel lockups and is mainly in the form of dicta, today’s courts appear willing to
uphold lock-ups, particularly if the assets of a financially distressed
company are at stake or if the court is of the opinion that limited
serious merger partners exist.313 In potentially upholding a lock-up
based on one of these reasons, however, courts should be cautious that
dealmakers are not using these “reasons” as a means of concealing a
fleecing of the target’s assets and, consequently, shareholder value. As
Vice Chancellor Parsons alluded to in the Apple-AuthenTec litigation,
courts should scrutinize the underlying business transaction and the
sale process preceding entry into the lock-up.314
This is not to say that dealmakers should eschew crown jewel
lock-ups. To the contrary, dealmakers should not be as quick to shy
away from lock-ups as they have been in the past. In agreeing to lockups, however, targets must be sure that an active auction process or an
extensive market canvass has taken place (at least a process similar to
that which occurred in the Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales
transaction). Moreover, targets may even inform bidders that the target
would be willing to agree to a crown jewel lock-up following an
extensive sale process. As a result, and consistent with arguments I
have made in previous articles addressing deal protection devices,
bidders may be enticed to submit even higher bids for the target
company.315 To avoid the possibility that the target may be left at the
altar without its most valuable family jewels, target boards also must
ensure that the option to purchase is only triggered when the target has
terminated the agreement to enter into a definitive agreement with
another bidder. Admittedly, this will deter potential third-party
overbids, but because the target will have already engaged in an
extensive sale process, pursuant to which any potential bidders will
have already had the opportunity to pursue a transaction, the likelihood
that the target or its shareholders will be harmed is minimal.
Undeniably, this entails a weighing of the extensiveness of the sales
process and the likelihood that no additional value has been left on the
table against the deterrent nature of the lock-up itself. Engaging in an
313. See supra text accompanying notes 206-207.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 206-207.
315. See, e.g., Sautter, supra note 260, at 567-69 (setting forth a framework allowing
for “don’t ask, don’t waive” standstills to be used that is based on the target engaging in an
extensive presigning sales process).
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extensive sale process in which all bidders are told that the target is
willing to, and is likely to, agree to a lock-up at the end of the process
should result in achieving the highest possible value for stockholders.316
Engaging in an extensive sale process and permitting lock-ups only
under these limited circumstances will ensure that the target’s family
jewels are not being fleeced and that crown jewel lock-ups could
become an enduring classic.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the saying goes, “everything old becomes new again.” Crown
jewel lock-ups are no different. Once a popular deal protection device
in the 1980s, crown jewel lock-ups have reemerged in some recent
deals. This time around, dealmakers have attempted to distinguish
these lock-ups from their predecessors. Dealmakers have taken almost
painstaking steps to differentiate today’s lock-ups from earlier lock-ups
and have attempted to make clear that the lock-up could be a standalone transaction or has a business purpose separate and apart from the
merger transaction itself. This Article argues, however, that today’s
lock-ups are not significantly different from their predecessors.
Practitioners and courts should not lose sight of the 1980s
jurisprudence that closely scrutinized the sale process preceding the
lock-up as well as the deterrent effects of the lock-up on potential
bidders. Failing to consider these factors and not giving these factors
proper weight potentially results in companies and their shareholders
being fleeced of their corporate family jewels and their value.

316. Professor Franklin A. Gevurtz has argued that “if the lock-up is large enough to
chase away any higher bidders and pressure shareholders into voting for the transaction
simply to avoid triggering the lock-up, then the lock-up gains nothing of value by buying time
for the shareholders.” Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485,
1508 (2013). Although this argument may be true, if the target has engaged in the type of
sale process this Article envisions and makes it clear to all potential bidders that there may be
certainty in the form of a crown jewel lock-up at the end of the process, there should not be a
situation where a higher bidder is deterred; that higher bidder will have already submitted its
bid on the front end. Of course, this argument presupposes that the sale process was quite
extensive in nature (i.e., that virtually every possible buyer was contacted) and that all bidders
were operating with the same information and rules. Hence, the courts would be scrutinizing
the sale process and whether the target board and its advisors ran the sale process in good
faith.

